revealed loan rejection rates that were twice as high for blacks as for whites, which generated an intense period of congressional oversight and fair lending actions. Based on an enhanced version of the 1990 HMDA data for the Boston area, a major study circulated in 1992 by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston provided striking, but controversial, new evidence of discriminatory treatment by lenders against minorities. In both the research and the enforcement communities, the issue of discrimination in mortage lending is currendy one of most controversial topics in the area of civil rights.'
Defining Racial Discrimination: Prejudice Over Profit?
The debate and controversy begins with fundamental disagreements about how to define and measure racially discriminatory behavior. Much of the confusion and controversy arises because the definition of discrimination used by some economists is narrower than the current legal definition of discrimination. A key conceptual dividing line here is whether prejudice must be put ahead of profits for behavior to be labeled as discriminatory, or whether lenders can be labeled as discriminators even if their intent is to increase profits. Gary Becker's 1971 Becker's book (originally published in 1957 is the seminal work on the economics of discrimination. According to Becker, discriminatory behavior emerges from prejudice or a "taste for discrimination" and it requires that the discriminator pay or forfeit income for the privilege of exercising prejudicial tastes. Applying this definition to the field of mortgage lending, economists in the Becker tradition might claim that some actions that the law would interpret as unfair treatment of a protected group do not represent discrimination, on the grounds that lenders were simply trying to maximize profits. To accept the conclusion of discrimination, such an economist would require evidence that the group receiving the differentially adverse treatment imposes credit risks that on average are no higher thjm those imposed by other groups of borrowers. While Becker's focus on the "taste for discrimination" has achieved significant currency within the economics profession, other well-known economists, including Kenneth Arrow and Edmund Phelps, have developed models for understanding discriminatory behavior that do not assume the lender (or the employer in the labor market situation) is prejudiced or foregoes profits. Differentially adverse treatment of a protected group may instead result from "statistical" discrimination; that is, discrimination that occurs because the lender finds it cheaper to use the characteristics of an applicant's group, such as its race, to esdmate the applicant's creditworthiness rather than the applicant's own past history. In some situations, dis-crimination of this form may show up as profit-driven, but racially differing, rules of thumb that the lender uses to weight legitimate characteristics of various groups of borrowers. The legal definition of racial discrimination does not presume that lenders are foregoing profits to exercise prejudice against the protected group. Hence, illegal discrimination need not be uneconomic in the sense that it reduces profits.
Anddiscrimination laws prohibit lenders from treadng equally creditworthy borrowers differendy based on some protected characteristic such as their race or gender. For example, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (sec. 701, as amended in March 1976) states that it "shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transacdon . . . on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age . . ." The Fair Housing Act of 1968 uses similar language (except that it omits marital status). These laws have been interpreted to mean that while lenders are allowed to differentiate among applicants based on the characterisdcs of the applicant or the property that are linked to the expected return on the loan, they are not allowed to use the applicant's membership in a protected group to disdnguish among applicants. In essence, the law requires that lenders make decisions about mortgage loans as if they had no informadon about the applicant's race, regardless of whether race is or is not a good proxy for risk factors not easily observed by the lender.
In addition, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act makes it illegal for lenders to discriminate on the basis of the racial composition of the neighborhood and several federal courts have interpreted the Fair Housing Act in the same way. Because of the red lines that lenders were alleged to have drawn around geographic areas within which they refused to make loans (or to make them only on less favorable terms), this geographic-based form of discrimination is often called "redlining."
The fact that the broader definidon of discrimination is embodied in current law provides a powerful jusdficadon for defining discriminadon in that way throughout this ardcle. Hence, the definition of discrimination used here is broader than that associated with Becker. In contrast to his definidon, this definidon implies that stricter enforcement of anddiscriminadon laws could possibly reduce the short-run profits of lenders and also that market pressures may not compete discriminadon away. While some economists may view the laws as unfair to lenders, these laws reflect the societal judgement that the benefits from increased social jusdce for minorides are worth more than the costs of potentially inefficient behavior by the lenders.
Measuring Disparate Treatment of Protected Groups
Muldple regression analysis allows one to compare a large number of loan application files while controlling for the relevant information in the lender's informadon set at the time of the decision. A straightforward regression model to test for whether lenders discriminate against minorides at the loan application stage might take the form R = f{A,P, T, M,N) , where Ris the probability that the loan is rejected, A and P refer to characteristics of the applicant and the property that can be observed by the lender and that are plausible determinants of the expected return on the loan, T is a vector of mortgage terms such as maturity and interest rate. Mis a 0-1 indicator variable denodng the race of the applicant, and AT is a set of indicator variables denodng the neighborhood of the subject property.^ Provided that all the relevant risk-related applicant and property characterisdcs available to the lender are included in the equadon, a positive coefficient on the race variable would indicate discrimination against minorides and a posidve coefficient on specific neighborhood variables could indicate redlining.
This regression framework is commonly used and analydcally sound. A somewhat more complex form would allow for interactions between the race of the applicant (and also possibly locadon) and the other variables in the equadon. This specificadon would indicate whether lenders evaluate different applicant or property characterisdcs differendy by racial group and hence would shed addidonal light on the mechanism through which lenders differentiate their treatment by racial group. Another approach would carry out this test bank by bank, so that one can determine whether a specific bank is treadng minority applicants differendy than white applicants, as argued by Stengel and Glennon (1995) .
This approach, like most of the recent academic literature and public controversy, applies to the treatment of borrowers at the application stage of the process. The discussion in this article will maintain that focus. However, it is worth noting that based on current laws, unfair treatment of minorides could potendctlly occur at several other stages in the lending process. One stage has to do with the selecdon of the "service area" that a depository insdtution chooses to serve. According to the Community Reinvestment Act, depository insdtudons are obligated to help meet the credit needs of their endre service areas. However, a lender might define its service area to exclude most minorities; in the 1992 Decatur case in Adanta, for example, the bank had defined its service area to exclude 75 percent of die AfricanAmerican populadon in one of Adanta's major counties. A second stage relates to whether adverdsing and marketing through real estate agents is done on a nondiscriminatory basis. A third stage is prescreening of mortgage applicants. Although some prescreening is legidmate and appropriate, it becomes illegal when it is used to discourage minority borrowers from applying for loans. The fourth stage is whether minority buyers are granted less favorable loan terms such as higher interest rates or shorter maturities than white buyers. Discrimination at these other stages deserves more attention from researchers.
Moreover, while the regression framework is likely to uncover disparate treatment of minorides, it might not spot cases in which the even-handed applicadon
•'This specification follows Ymger (1996a) . It is fully consistent with the Boston Fed study approach discussed below which characterizes the control variables by their contributions to the probability and costs of default.
of a bank's lending standards is having an adverse impact on people in protected classes. According to the adverse-impact concept of discriminadon, a lender would be discriminadng if it were using a specific applicant or property characterisdc in the loan evaluadon process that had a dispropordonately adverse impact on minorides and that could not be justified in terms of the profitability of the loan. For example, a lender could use an applicant's income as the basis for radoning credit-which would most likely lead to fewer loans to minorities who tend to have lower income than whites-only if the applicant's income can be shown to be related to the risk of default, all other factors held constant. Such an outcome is not assured, especially if the lender is also considering the rado of debt or housing expense (or both) to the applicant's income as a separate criterion. In a study of ten savings banks, the New York State Banking Department found that four had lending standards (such as high minimum down-payment rados) that could adversely affect minorides, women, and low income and predominandy minority neighborhoods (cited by Galster, 1996, p. 689) . However, allegadons of adverse impact require that the analyst understand the relationship between all variables used to evaluate the riskiness of the loan and their impacts on the bank's profitability. Such determinadons are often difficult to make and hence have not been the focus of most of the recent research and enforcement efforts.
The focus for this ardcle is disparate treatment, rather than adverse impact. However, as we will see in die later discussion of "credit scoring," the two concepts may be interrelated.
How Plausible is it that Mortgage Lenders Might Discriminate?
In the past, mortgage lenders have clearly discriminated against some groups of borrowers and much of the discriminadon was overdy part of their policy guidelines. For example, prior to the passage of the 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act, banks often had explicit policies to treat women less favorably than men. As documented by several surveys in the 1970s, mortgage lenders often discounted a wife's income by 50 percent or more when evaluadng mortgage applicadons and banks were more likely to discount the wife's income if she was of child-bearing age or if the family included pre-school children. When the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 prohibited sex-based classificadons and income discounting, the change seems to have had a dramatic effect on bank policies toward women (Schafer and Ladd, 1981; Ladd,1982) . Now that racial discrimination in mortgage lending agjtinst minorities is clearly illegal under both ECOA and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, how plausible is it to believe that banks might continue to discriminate against protected groups, especially minorides?
Given the current compedtive environment for mortgage lending, lending institudons are unlikely to be willing to forego profits as the price for implementing discriminadon. If some lenders would prefer not to lend to minorities, they would lose profits relative to other firms. As bankers point out, they are in business to make money. To make money on mortgages diey need to make loans for which the expected return from the interest payments exceeds the expected costs of the loan, including any possible loss from having to foreclose on the property.
However, the desire to make money, combined with other factors such as prejudicial atdtudes on die part of bank customers or die costs of gathering informadon, could sdll lead lenders to discriminate against minorides. For example, consider savings and loan associations or other depository lenders who obtain their loanable funds through the savings of local residents. To the extent that the those local depositors are prejudiced against minorities and would prefer not to have minorities as neighbors, they would be less willing to deposit their funds in a local savings and loan that was known to provide local mortgages to minorides than to one diat did not. In this way, prejudice on die part of die banks' customers could lead a profit-maximizing insdtudon to discriminate against minorides. John Ymger (1986, p. 892) provides some evidence of this behavior for other actors in the housing market, namely, real estate agents who apparendy cater to the racial prejudice of their current or potendal white customers.
Lending institudons would also have a profit-oriented motive to discriminate against minority borrowers if, even after controlling as best diey could for borrower and property characterisdcs, they expected minorides on average to have higher default rates than whites. Lenders might believe, for example, that discrimination against minorities in the labor market could make the income of minorides more voladle on average over the economic cycle than that of whites, even controlling for type of job, and hence make minorides more likely to default. Or they may note that minorides typically are less able to rely on friends or reladves to help them dirough tough economic dmes. These beliefs would lead lenders to treat minorides adversely, provided the race of the applicant were a cheaper screening device than the other ways diey might disdnguish between the quality of otherwise similar applicants.
Somewhat surprisingly, very litde information on default rates by race is available. In one review of die default literature that went back to die 1960s, Quercia and Stegman (1992) briefiy mendon only one ardcle that used race as an explanatory variable. According to diat study by Evans et al. (1985) , blacks had 7.5 percent more defaults than whites, but the difference in expected losses was only 2.4 percent. A more recent study, discussed in greater depdi below, found diat raw default rates on loans insured by the Federal Housing Administradon were 2 percentage points higher for black borrowers than for white borrowers, even after other key characterisdcs of the borrower and the neighborhood were taken into account (Berkovec et al., 1996b, p. 20) . If the evidence of higher default rates among minority groups holds up in future research, it would provide a modve for lenders to engage in profit-modvated stadstical discriminadon against minorides.
However, two puzzles remain about the plausibility of such stadsdcal discriminadon. The first puzzle relates to the important role of the secondary market in mortgage loans. Mortgage lenders are part of a complex financial system that in-eludes governmental agencies such as the Federal Housing Administradon (FHA) and the Veterans Administration (VA) which guarantee loans, and agencies that consdtute a secondary market for mortgage loans, such as the Federal Nadonal Mortgage Association (FNMA, "Fannie Mae"), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC, "Freddie Mac") and the Government Nadonal Mortage Associadon (GNMA "Ginnie Mae").^ Lenders in the secondary market buy loans from direct lenders and resell them. For present purposes, the important characterisdc of this process is that the risks of default are shifted to investors in the secondary market, and so it is not clear why loan originators such as banks should need to pay attendon to any race-specific probability of default. Provided die loan meets the standards imposed by the secondary market, originators of loans would have litde or no incendve to avoid the addidonal risks they might perceive to be associated with some loans to minorides.
However, only about 50 percent of loans are sold to tbe secondary market in the first year of the loan. Moreover, if die originator can exercise some discredon with respect to the guidelines and pays some price for selling risky loans to the secondary market, die originator condnues to have an incendve to pracdce stadsdcal discriminadon against minorities. Recent studies of the secondary market offer some evidence to support diis possibility (Van Order, 1996) . To reduce the incendve of loan originators to sell their riskier loans to that market and to retain their less risky loans, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have set guidelines as to what makes a quality loan and have imposed requirements such as diat loans with high loan-tovalue ratios have private mortgage insurance. However, to maximize the potential of the secondary market to mobilize capital, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac also permit a fair degree of lender discretion. They allow lenders to sell diem nonstandard loans provided the imperfecdons of die loan are offset by compensating factors so that the credit risk remains unchanged. To minimize die chances that lenders will abuse this discredon, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac punish lenders who sell excessively risky loans by making them repurchase bad loans diat were outside the guidelines and by threatening to stop buying loans from diem. In pracdce, lenders appear to have significant leeway for discredon because most applicants-both white and black-fail to meet one or more of the guidelines (Browne and Tootell, 1995, p. 56) .
Are the guidelines in the secondary market discriminatory or applied in a discriminatory manner? If so, then discriminatory outcomes for borrowers could reflect unfair treatment not by the originators of loans, but rather by the lenders in the secondary market. One study found no evidence of such discrimination in the secondary market (Van Order, 1996) . However, research in diis area is difficult and much more remains to be done.
The second puzzle relates to the mechanism through which the originators of 'Virtually all FHA and VA insured loans are sold to GNMA. Originally, conventional mortgages originated by mortgage bankers were sold primarily to FNMA and conventional loans originated by thrift institutions were sold to FHLMC but that distinction no longer applies.
loans implement discriminadon. Given that statistical discrimination is illegal, lenders cannot discriminate as a matter of explicit bank policy, as they did with women. One possibility is that lenders evaluate objective information differently for minorides than for whites. For example, in a follow-up analysis of data collected by the Boston Federal Reserve Bank, Carr and Megbolugbe (1993) found that the lender's subjecdve measure of an applicant's creditworthiness was highly correlated with the race of the applicant, even after controlling for three objecdve measures of borrower credit histories. Also, Bosdc (1996) found evidence that lenders use rules of thumb to weight different components of a loan applicadon differendy by race. Another mechanism through which lenders might engage in stadsdcal discriminadon, referred to as the "thick file" phenomenon, emerged from the investigadon of Decatur Federal in Adanta. It seemed that loan officers at that institudon often provided more assistance to white than to minority lenders, so that the files of the white borrowers were likely to end up thicker dian those of minority borrowers, and because of that assistance, may have been more likely to be approved.''
These forms of discriminadon may evolve because lenders believe that denying loans to minorides will raise bank profits. Alternadvely, they may evolve from the cultural affinides of white loan officers. The idea is that because white loan officers may have less cultural affinity with and hence less knowledge of minority applicants, they may be likely to perceive objective informadon differently for minority applicants than for white applicants and to rely more heavily on that information rather than invesdng marginal resources in gathering more informadon on the creditworthiness of minority applicants (Calomiris, Kahn and Longhofer, 1994; Hunter and Walker, 1996) . A variadon on this theme argues that because most loan officers process more white applicadons dian black applicadons, loan officers have more informadon on whites than on black applicants, and hence have less need to use group characterisdcs for whites than they do for minorides. Although these mechanisms have some plausibility, their prevalence and importance have not been fully documented and are worth further invesdgadon.
Evidence of Disparate Treatment
Evidence that minority groups are treated differently by lenders can be separated into three categories: differences in loan denial rates, differences in loan default rates, and evidence on the possibility of geographic redlining.
Loan Applications Data
In an early study of loan applicadons data, Schafer and Ladd (1981) took advantage ofthe detailed data on applicadons available under state law in California • * As tioted by Yinger (1996a) , if the assistance shows up in variables that the lender explicitly examines, the assistance may serve not only as an explanation for a positive finding of discrimination, but it may also indicate that the standard estimate of the extent of discrimination is downward biased.
and New York. Using applicadons data for state-regulated S&L's in California in 1977-78 and for commercial banks, mutual savings banks, and S&L's in New York in 1976-78, Schafer and Ladd estimated a series of models for each of many metropolitan areas in each state. The goal was to test for discriminadon against a wide variety of groups including those defined by race, by gender, and by marital status. They found considerable evidence of discriminadon against blacks. In 18 of the 32 California areas and six of the ten New York areas, black applicants had significandy higher chances of loan denial than similcirly situated whites. The differences were large, with black applicants being 1.58 to 7.82 dmes as likely to be denied as whites.
Other than the direct evidence of discriminadon, perhaps the most interesdng aspect of the results was what diey indicated about die differences in disparate treatment toward women and minorides over dme. For die first year of die analysis in both states, die authors found differendally adverse treatment of women in a few metropolitan areas and against minorides in a large number of the metropolitan areas. However, in the second year ofthe analysis, differendal treatment of women all but disappeared, while diat of minorides remained. After the passage of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in 1976, it apparendy did not take long for banks to change their policies toward women, many of which may have been based on outdated stereotypes about women's commitment to die labor market. The differendal treatment of minorides, in contrast, apparendy reflected a more subde and less overt process that was more difficult to eliminate (Ladd, 1982; Schafer and Ladd, 1981) .
The set of control variables used to control for die riskiness of the loan was crucial to the Schafer and Ladd (1981) study, as well as to more recent studies. For the California analysis, the authors used applicant income, income reladve to the requested loan, the loan-to-value rado, income of secondary earners, age of applicant, age of property, and census tract or zip code variables to control for die neighborhood. The control variables for the New York analysis were comparable but also included net wealth and years at present occupadon. This set of control variables was quite rich. However, the absence of a wealth variable in the California data set and of credit history variables for either state left die study open to the cridcism that key variables had been omitted.
The 1989 expansion ofthe data repordng requirements for lending insdtudons under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 provided new data on individual applicadons for addidonal research. Beginning in 1990, nine variables are now included for each applicadon: date of applicadon; loan amount; census tract of property; if the property is owner-occupied; purpose of the loan (purchase, improvement or refinancing); loan guarantee (convendonal, FHA, or VA); loan disposidon (approved, approved but withdrawn, no lender acdon taken, or denied); race; gender; and applicant income. Moreover, the set of repordng lenders was expanded beyond depository insdtudons to include independent mortgage companies. The 1994 data, for example, included informadon on more dian 12 million loan applicadons from over 3000 lenders (Goering and Wienk, 1996) . However, the new HMDA data sdll fell short of what was required for a conclusive study of racial discriminadon. Several key variahles, such as the characterisdcs of the property and the credit history of the applicant, were not included.
These limitadons were direcdy addressed hy die Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in its recent study of discriminadon in mortgage lending. To supplement the HMDA data, researchers at the Boston Fed sought the cooperadon of lenders throughout the Boston metropolitan area. Their procedure was to examine all of the 1990 loan applicadons fi-om minorides in the Boston area, plus a random sample of applicadons fi-om whites. For each applicadon, the researchers asked lenders to provide an addidonal set of 38 pieces of informadon which, according to prior discussions with the lenders, included all the informadon in the lender's informadon set at the dme the loan was made. Some files were dropped from the analysis because of missing data and others because the borrower withdrew die applicadon hefore a decision was made. The final sample included about 3000 applicadons, 700 of which were from blacks and Hispanics. With this rich data set, the researchers were armed to test for discriminadon in mortgage lending. The study was originally circulated in 1992, then revised in response to some of the early cridcisms and published in the March 1996 issue ofthe American Economic Review (Munnell et al., 1996) .
The basic strategy ofthe Boston Fed study was to esdmate a regression equadon to explain the probability that a loan would be denied as a funcdon of four categories of variables: those that affect the risk of default, those that affect the costs of default, loan characterisdcs, and personal characterisdcs Of the borrower. Among the latter is a race variable that takes on the value of 1 for both blacks and Hispanics and 0 otherwise.^ A posidve coefficient on the race variable represents an esdmate of the extent to which minorides were adversely treated by lenders simply on the basis of race-at least assuming that the researchers have fully controlled for all the other legally permissible variables used by the lender to evaluate the loan applicadon.
The complete set of variables is listed in Table I . Pardcularly noteworthy is the inclusion of some key variables related to the risk of default that are missing from most previous studies of loan denials: the consumer's credit history, mortgage credit history, public record of defaults or bankruptcies, and level of employment instability. Most of the other variables are reladvely straightforward. To test for the robustness of the results, the authors test a wide variety of models and specificadons.
Before adjusdng for any of the control variables, the loan denial rate was 10 percent for whites and 28 percent for minorides. This big differendal is gready reduced when personal and property characterisdcs are controlled for, since those characterisdcs tend to be dispropordonately unfavorable to minorides. Once these variables are taken into account either through ordinary least squares regressions or logit models, the gap shrinks from 18 percentage points to about 8 percentage points. That is, if the typical denial rate for whites was 10 percent, the typical denial A statistical test based on separate coefficients for the two groups of minorities would not allow the authors to reject the hypothesis of no difference in the coefficients. Hence all the reported regressions are based on the single aggregated "race" variable. rate for a comparable black applicant would be about 18 percent. Given the comprehensiveness ofthe set of control variables, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the remaining differendals between whites and minorides indicate that lenders discriminate against minorides in the lending decision.
Moreover, since this study does not measure the amount of potendal discriminadon at other points in the lending process, it probably understates the extent to which lenders discriminate. As mendoned earlier, lenders could also discriminate in dieir selecdon of the insdtudon's "service area," in their adverdsing and markedng strategy, at the prescreening stage, and in the setdng of mortage terms.
These results have been subjected to tremendous scnidny and cridcism. The Boston Fed made the underlying data available, so that researchers had the opportunity to examine the quality of the data and to test alternadve specificadons. Various combinadons of the original authors have responded to their cridcs in numerous publicadons (Browne and Tootel, 1995; Tootel, 1996; Munnell et al., 1996) . What follows is a brief summeiry ofthe types of cridcisms and the authors' responses to them. Some of the cridcisms applied to the original version and no longer apply to the final version of the study. The bottom line is that the results related to race are extremely robust.
The easiest attacks to dismiss are those related to the integrity of the data (Home, 1994) . Cridcs idendfied a large number of so-called coding or data errors, but a closer analysis showed that some of them were not errors and odiers were irrelevant to the analysis since they applied to parts of the HMDA data diat were not used in the regression (Tootell, 1996) . Various studies have since confirmed that using a modified, cleaner data set does not alter any of the conclusions about the role of race (Carr and Megholugbe, 1993) .
On a potendally more substandve note, some researchers quesdoned the absence from the model of a few variables that were in the data set. For example, Zandi (1993) cridcized the audiors for not including a variable diat represented die lender's subjecdve evaluadon of the borrower's creditwordiiness, a measure intended to summarize three objecdve measures of creditworthiness that were already in the equadon. The inclusion of this variable somedmes causes the coefficient of the race variable to become unimportant. However, both odier researchers and the Fed researchers have persuasively argued diat the variable should not be included in the model (Tootell, 1996; Carr and Megbolugbe, 1993) . The quesdon on which the variable was based did not appear on die original loan applicadon form and the answer was recorded after the decision was made about the disposidon of the loan. The Boston Fed reseju-chers show that it appears to be very similar to the denial variable and hence is unsuitahle as an exogenous explanatory variable.
A variety of other specificadon issues have been noted: that some variables might better be specified in threshold form; that the Boston Fed researchers erred in collapsing answers to nine quesdons pertaining to consumer credit and mortgages into two variables; and that applicants who were denied private mortgage insurance should have been eliminated from the sample. However, modifying the specificadon in these ways has litde or no effect on the race coefficient (Stengel and Glennon, 1994 ). Yet another specificadon argument is that certain loan terms, especially the loan-to-value rado, may create a simultaneity problem if borrowers may negodate with the lender and agree to reduce the loan amount in response to die possibility that the loan will be denied (Yezer, Phillips, and Trost, 1994) . However, while some negodadon may take place, it need not rule out interpredng the process as a sequendal one. Moreover, the results do not change when instrumental variables are used for the loan-to-value rado (Browne and Tootell, 1995) .*F inally, some cridcs fault the authors of the Boston Fed study for interpredng their race findings as evidence of discriminadon against minorides. Their argument is that higher levels of loan denial, all else held constant, does not prove the existence of discriminadon unless the authors can show that loans to minorides, all else constant, are no more risky than loans to whites (Brimelow and Spencer, 1993; Becker, 1993) . The specific evidence on default rates will be considered in the next secdon. For die moment, however, suffice it to say that these cridcs are implicidy ' The identifying instruments include liquid assets, years on the job, education, marital status, gender and years in this line of work. These variables all affect the loan-to-value ratios but are not significant in the denial equation.
assuming that discriminadon must be explained in terms of lenders placing prejudice above profits. In odier words, these cridcs refuse to acknowledge the possibility of stadsdcal discriminadon.
An interesdng twist on diis argument comes from Bosdc (1996) . Using the Boston Fed data, he expands the specificadon of die equadon to include terms that interact race with die other applicant and property characterisdcs. When diis is done, Bosdc finds diat lenders accord minorides favorable treatment widi respect to the loan-to-value rado and adverse treatment with respect to debt burdens, and diat the remaining stand-alone race variable has a stadsdcally insignificant coefficient. Although Bosdc shows that the net effect of these two opposite effects is that lenders treat marginally qualified minority borrowers adversely reladve to otherwise similar white borrowers, he refuses to call this discriminadon on die grounds diat lenders are evaluadng characterisdcs of minorides differendy than diose of whites based on profit-maximizing rules of diumb. However, according to the legal definidon of discriminadon, rules of thumb with a racial dimension are not permitted. They violate the requirement that applicants be treated as individuals, not as members of a protected category.
In sum, the Boston Fed study provides persuasive evidence that lenders in the Boston area discriminated against minorides in 1990, even in the presence of clear laws that make racial discriminadon unlawful and market pressures diat should eliminate taste-based discriminadon. The study has survived close scrudny by a host of skepdcal cridcs. While some people might be tempted to belitde its significance, since it is based on a single metropolitan area that has had a long and troubled history of race reladons, such a judgement would be precipitate. According to die HMDA data, which can be compared across cides, Boston is not an oudier in terms of the reladonship between white and minority denial rates.L
oan Default Studies
Some researchers have tried to approach the issue from the other end; that is, instead of looking at evidence on the disposidon of loan applicadons, they examine evidence on loan performance (Van Order et al., 1993; Berkovec et al., 1994 Berkovec et al., , 1996a . However, their argument at best applies only to taste-based discriminadon. If lenders were engaged in discriminadon modvated by dieir prejudice, diey would do so by setdng a higher cutoff in terms of creditworthiness for minorides than for whites so diat, at die margin, the minorides who received loans would be more creditwordiy dian the whites who received loans. Hence, die argument goes, loans to minorides would be expected to perform better than those of white applicants, a hypothesis diat can be tested by examining loan defaults by race. Because ' Based on HMDA data for 1992, the ratio of loan denial rates for blacks to whites for the following selected cities were Boston (2.2), AUanta (2.6), Chicago (3.2), Dallas (2.3), New York City (1.6), San Francisco (2.2) and Washington D.C. (2.8). The absolute denial rate for blacks in Boston was 22 percent and it ranged from 17 to 31 percent in the other cities. (Data from the Right-to-Know Network on the internet.) the data indicate that minorides have higher default rates than whites, not lower, diese authors reject die hypothesis that lenders discriminated against minorides in the loan approval process.
The main evidence to support this posidon can be found in studies by Berkovec et al. (1996a, b) , which are based on a large sample of single family mortgage loans originated between 1987 and 1989. As one example of dieir findings, for die 1987 cohort of borrowers, the default rate was 9 percent for hlacks and 4.3 percent for whites. While the addidon of stadsdcal controls for loan and borrower characterisdcs reduced the differendal by about a half, it sdll left a stadsdcally significant black-white differendal of about 2 percentage points.
Of course, die methodology of die Berkovec et al. (1996a, b) study can be quesdoned as well. First, dieir analysis is based endrely on loans insured by the Federal Housing Administradon, while die Boston Fed study is based on convendonal loans. FHA loans are more cosdy than convendonal loans and have a low cutoff for the maximum loan amount. For these reasons and because minorides are more likely to use FHA mortgages than convendonal mortgages, the reladve default rates of blacks and whites could differ between the two types of mortgages. Second, Berkovec et al. mejisure defaults by lender foreclosures of mortgaged properdes, which raises the possibility that they are measuring something with an element of lender discredon, rather than just the behavior of horrowers (Ymger, 1996b, p. 27 ).* Finally, as Berkovec et al. acknowledge, their data set does not allow them to control for the credit history of the borrower. Omitdng a variable such as credit history which the lender uses to evaluate loan applicadons biases the results of a loan default study away from a finding of discriminadon.
However, a problem deeper than these specificadon issues arises because neither the lender nor the researcher is ahle to observe all the characterisdcs likely to affect the creditworthiness of the borrower and these unobserved credit characterisdcs are likely to be less favorable for blacks dian for whites (Ymger, 1996a, b; Galster, 1996) . Because the variables are not easily observed or measured, even a complete data set on defaults would not include them. Indeed, it is precisely the presence of those unobservables, examples of which were mendoned earlier, that could induce lenders to engage in stadsdcal discriminadon against blacks in the loan approval process. In the absence of any discriminadon by lenders (either profit driven or taste-based), the differendal effect of these unobservable variables would lead to a higher default rate for hlacks than for whites.
The existence of such unobservable credit factors creates a serious problem for interpredng default-based studies of discriminadon. The problem arises because it is impossible to sort out the two separate effects on the default rate of blacks " Ymger (1996a) has also pointed out that the theory relates not strictly to default rates but rather to default rates times the size of the loss. Hence, additional information on how much lenders lose on a typical default by a black borrower relative to a white borrower would be useful to complete the story. While Berkovec et al. (1995) try to address this issue, Ross (1996) raises some important criticisms of their approach.
relative to whites. Working in one direction, the presence of the unobservable factors disproportionately increases the likelihood of blacks defaulting on any approved loan. Working in the other direction, taste-based or profit-motivated discrimination decreases the likelihood of default for blacks because fewer loans are approved to that group. For example, if the unobservable factors generated a default rate for blacks that was 4 percentage points higher than for whites (after the researcher has controlled for all the legally permissible characteristics used by the lender in the loan approval process), then, contrary to their interpretation, the Berkovec et al. finding of a 2 percentage point differential would be consistent with the hypothesis that lenders discriminate at the loan approval stage: the rate differential between blacks and whites is lower than it would be in the absence of discrimination. However, because we do not know in practice how the unobservable factors associated with race affect the probability of default, evidence from default studies provide no clear information about whether lenders discriminate against minorities.® This problem of unobservable variables does not arise in a study of loan approval, especially one as complete at that by the Boston Fed which includes all the variables used by the lenders. Berkovec et al. (forthcoming) have recently developed a new strategy for using default data to test specifically for taste-based discrimination. In the spirit of Becker's work, they posit that taste-based discrimination, but not profit-driven statistical discrimination, should be higher when lenders have more market power. Hence, they argue that the coefficient on the interaction of race and the concentration of the mortgage lending market could provide information on whether lenders engage in taste-based discrimination. This approach avoids the bias in their earlier tests for discrimination because the market power of the lenders is not correlated with the unobserved variables. Based on a large sample of data on the performance of FHA loans, the authors find that the coefficient on the interaction term is not statistically significant. Hence, they conclude that lenders do not engage in taste-based discrimination. However, this new study sheds no light on whether lenders engage in profit-motivated statistical discrimination.
If the default studies are flawed as a means of studying discrimination, why have diey generated so much interest? Surely, part of their appeal, especially to bankers, is because they have been interpreted as evidence that lenders are not " Brueckner (1996) provides a particularly clear mathematical exposition ofthe problem. Letting C be the perceived security of a loan, we can write C = aX + HI + « where X represents variables that are observed both by the lender and the analyst and R is an indicator variable that takes on the value 1 for blacks. The parameter a measures the effects of the measured variables and b (expected to be negative) the unmeasured and unobserved effects of race on the perceived security of the loan, and e a random error term. If A=0, then the prediction by Berkovec et al. that discrimination tends to lower the average default probability for blacks is correct. However, if b is not zero, which means that blacks have higher true probabilities of default, the prediction becomes ambiguous. For any X and e, any black now has a higher default probability than a white, which makes the average default probability higher for blacks than for whites. The result is that the effect of race on the average default probability is ambiguous. Also see the simulation based critique of this approach in Ross (forthcoming).
discriminating. More generally, the answer may relate largely to the appeal of Becker's narrow definition of discrimination, under which higher default rates for blacks provide the economic rationale for lenders to treat black borrowers differently from white borrowers and, hence, for the conclusion that lenders are not engaged in prejudice-based discrimination. But with respect to the legal definition of discrimination, the bottom line is clear: denial of loans on grounds of membership in a protected group is against the law, regardless of whether it can be justified in some average sense by default rates.
Geographic Redlining
Some ofthe policy interest in lender discrimination is as much about neighborhood deterioration and decline as it is about unfair treatment of individuals. The fear is that banking practices may exacerbate the problems of poor neighborhoods by systematically denying them credit. The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 addresses this concern by imposing an affirmative action on lenders to help meet the credit needs of the bank's entire community, including lowand moderate-income neighborhoods, as consistent with safe and sound operation of the bank.
Before 1989, when the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act was expanded to require that lenders provide data on indi\idual loan applications, empirical studies of geographic redlining suffered from a difficult problem: it was impossible to separate the behavior of lenders from what was happening to the demand for mortgages and more generally to the supply and demand of housing within the geographic area. Even the very careful study of mortgage lending patterns by geographic area based on the HMDA data by Bradbury, Case, and Dunham (1989) concluded (p. 25): "Whether the source ofthe racial pattern lies in the housing market or the mortgage market is impossible to tell."
Most of the other studies of redlining based on more refined techniques provide little or no evidence that mortgage lenders are currently discriminating against certain allegedly redlined areas. In an ambitious study that involved interviewing households who were involved in housing transactions (either as potential buyers or sellers) in Cincinnati, Indianapolis, and Nashville, Benston and Horsky (1991) found no differences between households in allegedly redlined areas and those in control areas in terms of their ability to secure mortgage financing. In the context ofthe regression framework presented earlier, the test for redlining involves measuring the effect of location or racial composition of the neighborhood, while controlling for other individual and neighborhood characteristics that affect the rate of return on the loan. Using that method, Schafer and Ladd (1981) found little evidence of geographic redlining. More recently, the authors of the Boston Fed study found no evidence that lenders in Boston deny loans to an area because it has a large proportion of minority residents or because it is poor and rundown (Munnell et al., no date) . They conclude that lenders discriminate not on the basis of the location of the property, but rather on the race of the applicant.
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Additional Research and Policy Directions
Where should research and policy with regard to discrimination in mortgage lending go from here? Two main suggestions appear in the literature: a call for audit studies to test for discrimination at the prescreening stage; and the use of "credit scoring" systems to rank mortgage applications.
Audit Studies and Discrimination in Mortgage Lending
In an audit study, pairs of comparable testers whose observable qualifications differ only by race would inquire about mortgage loans from specific lenders. Although such studies introduce their own problems, some of which are noted below, they could potentially provide straightforward and clear evidence of discrimination by lenders in general and by specific lenders. In addition, they allow investigation of how loan applicants are treated during the prescreening stage in the application process, not just after an application is filed.
Agencies such as the Department of Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission have either supported or used the results of auditing studies to ferret out discriminatory practices in other aspects of the housing market and in employment cases. Audit studies of real estate agents have been helpful in understanding differential rates of access to information about mortgages. The 1989 Housing Discrimination Study which conducted over 2,000 audits of real estate brokers in a national sample of metropolitan areas found large differences in the willingness of brokers to assist white and minority home buyers to secure mortgage financing; for example, only 13.3 percent of the black auditors were offered assistance in contrast to 24.4 percent of the white atiditors (Ymger, 1996a, p. 59) .
But no large-scale national studies have been undertaken in the area of mortgage lending. The closest we have come to such an attempt was in 1991, when the Federal Reserve Board of Governors rejected an ambitious proposal from its own Consumer Advisory Council for a national audit study of lender behavior at the prescreening stage. Since then, various smaller pilot studies have beeti undertaken and, under the aegis of HUD's Fair Housing Initiatives Program, many fair housing organizations have started to use the method for enforcement purposes (Galster, 1996, p. 710; Lawton, 1996; Smith and Cloud, 1996) . While the pilot studies have provided initial evidence ofthe feasibility and usefulness ofthe approach, none has been sufficiently rigorous to pass muster with the research and enforcement communities.
Several concerns about audit tests are worth noting (Galster, 1996) . First, additional small-scale tests are necessary to determine the sample sizes needed to detect the potentially subtle differences in treatment that might add up to a discriminatory outcome. Depending on the incidence of a particular behavior among lenders and the "true" differences in treatment among lenders, one author has estimated that the required sample size could rise to about 2100 paired tests. Second, for an inquiry about a loan to generate a serious and meaningful response, the potential borrowers need to identify the specific houses that they are buying.
None of the obvious ways of doing this in a study context-having potential borrowers claim to be buying homes that are being sold direcdy by owners, using dummy sales contracts, or even dummy real estate companies-is very satisfactory.
A third concem relates to potentially serious ethicsil and legal issues such as deception, use of human subjects-in this case the mortgage lending agents-without their knowledge, or consent and concerns about entrapment (Galster, 1993) . Fourth, the further into the application process that the testers probe, the more likely it is that lenders would start verifying some of the information. This consideration makes it difficult to imagine ever pushing the testing beyond the prescreening stage into the application stage of the process. Yet some of the studies illustrate the desirability of continuing the testing through the completion ofthe application (Smith jmd Cloud, 1996) . A fifth question involves the possibility that a testing study will be compromised by the lenders discovering that they are being tested. The chance of discovery rises the more tests are repeated in a given institution, the more similar and or unusual Jire the tester pair scenarios, the smaller is the institution in terms of loan originations and loan officers, the more predominandy white is the area in question (so that minority applicsuits stand out), and the more fabricated are the documents and histories of the testers.
Advocates of testing believe that these concerns can be effectively resolved and that testing is not only feasible but absolutely necessary as the next step in ferreting out discriminatory lending. They point out that even high-quality regression studies, such as that done by the Boston Fed, have provided neither clear-cut evidence of a smoking gun nor enough information about specific lenders to guide enforcement efforts. Civil rights activists and many researchers who are convinced that lenders discriminate believe that audit studies are the only way to provide irrefutable evidence of discrimination that will be understandable to all. Nonetheless, the methodological concerns over such studies are sufficiendy valid to justify caution as researchers and regulators move forward in the direction of large scale audit studies. In the meantime, additional experiments by fair housing groups and others would be desirable.
Credit Scoring
The idea of credit scoring models is to use historical data to estimate the relationship between the characteristics of the borrower and the property and the riskiness of the loan. The credit scoring model would then be used to predict the riskiness of future loans. This approach has long been used to evaluate applications for consumer loans and credit cards, but credit scoring is only now being considered and adopted by various actors within the mortgage market. In particular, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have recendy adopted credit scoring as an element in their loan evaluation process, and have recommended that the originators of loans use it as well (Galster, 1996; Carter, 1996) .
The main motivation for a credit scoring approach appears to be to reduce the costs of processing loan applications. However, some authors believe that the impersonality and objectivity of this approach could serve to reduce racial discrim-ination in the mortgage lending process (Galster, 1996) . Under a credit scoring approach, lenders could make decisions without ever seeing the applicant, and hence, without knovnng the applicant's race.
However, a number of dangers and questions should be noted. First, most of the credit scoring models to date have been developed by private firms, which means that they are proprietary and not subject to public scrutiny. That black-box quality has made many groups nervous. Second, even when models predict quite well in a broad statistical sense, they might be saying only that, say, 20 percent of those with similar characteristics have been delinquent or defaulted on their loans. Thus, for every five people turned down on the basis of such a finding, four would have repaid their loans on time. Third, there is a danger that a credit scoring model may have built into it standards that have adverse impacts on minority borrowers and that cannot be justified in terms of the riskiness of the loan. In this way, credit scoring might simply substitute discrimination in the form of adverse impacts for discrimination in the form of disparate treatment.
Conclusion
Much of the controversy about whether mortgage lenders discriminate against minorities can be explained in terms of the confusion about how to define discrimination. According to the legal definition, careful studies of loan denial rates, such as that done by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, represent an appropriate method for testing for discrimination by lenders. Based on that study, it is clear that mortgage lenders discriminate against minorities. The fact that minorities may have higher default rates on average than whites is irrelevant to the interpretation of the race coefficient in such models.
While it is not clear whether the discrimination that emerges from the Boston Fed study is attributable to a taste for discrimination or to profit-motivated statistical discrimination, my guess is that a substantial part of it is statistical discrimination driven by the drive for profits. If so, market forces are not likely to eliminate it.
I believe that we need a lot more research on and discussion about the relationship between the race of the applicant and delinquencies, defaults, and losses. Given the limited evidence currendy available, lenders may operate now more on their guesses about the loss experiences of blacks and minority groups than on concrete data. Of course, it is possible that this research could end up reinforcing the views of lenders that black applicants are less good risks than white applicants, even after holding constant all other measurable determinants of creditworthiness. However, further research might also generate criteria for lenders to evaluate loan applicants in a way that pays attention to individual differences and reduces the pressure for lenders to engage in statistical discrimination. The move to credit scoring systems has been one attempt in this direction. However, the different credit scoring models deserve research scrutiny as well, to be sure that they are not simply substituting discrimination in the form of adverse impact for discrimination in the form of disparate treatment.
